The subject of the history of Armenian terrorism and national and religious extremism, which is inseparably connected with it and has been the ethnic ideology of the Armenian people in their struggle for national statehood for a long time - at least, throughout the twentieth century, has never been a subject of study in the Russian scientific community. At the same time,

*The Moscow-Baku train blown up by Armenian terrorists in the territory of the Russian Federation near the city of Khasavyurt on 30 May 1991. 11 people were killed and 22 were injured*
the phenomenon of “Armenian terrorism” has objectively existed for over a hundred years, and therefore, like any other phenomenon of social and political history, it can be a subject of scientific study. The main thing is to ensure that the study is free from partiality, ideological bias, political conditions and other similar attributes that turn a scientific work into an instrument of propaganda or a political technique for manipulating the mass public consciousness.

Transnational Armenian terrorism as a socio-economic, socio-political and legal phenomenon originated in the late 19th century in the Ottoman Empire, from where it spilled over into the Russian Empire and the Balkan countries and then spread to Western Europe and North America. The first crimes of Armenian terrorism date back to the 1890s, so it has nothing to do with the theme of the notorious “Armenian genocide” in the Ottoman Empire in 1915, as well as their persecution in this country at an earlier or later time. It existed long before and in parallel with them, but noting this fact, we will not further dwell on its argumentation, because it is not related to our publication.

Any terrorism (including Armenian) is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, which can be analyzed from different perspectives - political, ideological, economic, historical, criminological, psychological and cultural. One person, who by virtue of his imperfection has limited knowledge and methods of learning, is objectively unable to equally well study and analyze this phenomenon in all or even in several planes. He can describe quite competently and in detail only one or at most two facets of this large-scale phenomenon, depending on the angle of view. Being clearly aware of our modest strength and opportunities (especially in access to reliable sources of information) and without claiming to comprehensively cover the subject, we decided to consider Armenian terrorism in its historical and legal retrospect, basing our research on the methodology of historical and criminological science. Since the volume of the journal does not allow us to do so in relation to the more than 100 years of the history of Armenian terrorism, we decided to limit ourselves to one climax stage or apogee of its activity, which coincided with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict of 1988-1994.

According to Russian criminal law, the 1988-1994 Karabakh war is a terrorist war, because all its content is a collection and sequence of “terrorist crimes”. Among this category of offenses, the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation considers the following illegal acts: a terrorist act (art. 205), hostage-taking (art. 206), the organization of an illegal armed formation or membership therein (art. 208), hijacking of aircraft or water transport or train (art. 211), encroachment on the life of a statesman or public figure (art. 277), an armed rebellion (art. 279), public calls for extremist activity (art. 280), and an attack on persons or institutions that enjoy international protection (art. 360). During the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, almost all these types of crimes were committed with varying intensity and frequency, and the offense in the form of the organization of an illegal armed formation or membership therein was ubiquitous throughout the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. It gives us every right to claim that the Armenian side of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict engaged in a confrontation with the forces of the Azerbaijan Republic mainly with the help of international terrorists and using terrorist means and methods.
The main striking force of the Armenian side in this war was militants of transnational terrorist groups – the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and Justice Commandos against Armenian Genocide (JCAG), which fell under the operational control of US intelligence in the middle of the 1980s. The process of their transfer to serve the CIA is described in detail in our book "History of Transnational Armenian Terrorism in the 20th Century: Historical and Criminological Research" [2], and therefore, in this publication we shall not dwell on the subject. We shall only note that this is a statement of contradictory substantial objections from our colleagues, which is why it may be considered reasonably justified. This means that in the historical perspective, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can be considered the first "hot front" of the geopolitical confrontation between East and West in the Cold War, the defeat in which led to the death of the Soviet Union, in the collapse of which Armenian terrorism effectively played the role of a destructive tool.

The renowned American researcher of Armenian terrorism Francis P. Hyland, whom we consider, if not a career CIA agent, then at least a specially invited freelance expert of this intelligence agency, clearly stated in the book "Armenian terrorism: the past, the present, the prospects" published at the beginning of 1991 that in the short-term the main target of transnational Armenian terrorism will be not the Republic of Turkey, as it was throughout the 1970s and 1980s, but the Soviet Union. In this regard, he said that the epicenter of the terrorist activity of Armenian nationalists will be the "Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan", the Armenian population of which "united and rebelled in response to oppression by the Muslim majority", [1, p. 87-88]. In fact, a year before the collapse of the Soviet Union (it is clear that Hyland finished writing his book in 1990), he pointed quite clearly to the main source of threats to the integrity of the country, designating it very specifically as "Armenian terrorism".

In the final part of his book devoted to the prospects of the criminological phenomenon, Hyland no less clearly specified the circumstances that led to such a change of purpose and the forces behind the change of the vector of goal-setting. As the starting point of this transformation process, he named the split in the ranks of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), which occurred in the summer of 1983 and resulted in the "military wing" splitting off from this terrorist entity and forming on its human resources and organizational basis a new or significantly modernized multinational group of Armenian terrorists called “the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia - Revolutionary Movement” (ASALA-RM). As mentioned above, the leader of the newly-formed structure was a citizen of the United States, the terrorist number 2 in the history of Armenian transnational terrorism in the 20th century, Monte Melkonian, who was prematurely released a couple of months earlier from a French prison where he was serving a sentence for illegal possession of weapons and illegal crossing of the state border and was deported to Yemen.

The Tbilisi-Baku passenger bus blown up by Armenian terrorists on 16 September 1989.
Five people were killed and 25 were injured

Victims of the terrorist attack on the Krasnovodsk-Baku ferry on 8 January 1992.
25 people were killed and 88 were injured.
In this connection, another circumstance is also quite remarkable: almost simultaneously with the emergence of ASALA-RM (to be more precise, four months before that) – in February 1983 – another Armenian terrorist organization “New Armenian Resistance” (NAR) ceased its terrorist activities (presumably as a result of dissolution). Three years later, in 1986, its example was followed by another Armenian terrorist group Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide, which “competed” with ASALA for two decades, gained notoriety in 1970-1980, carried out rebranding in 1982 because of the actions of the Turkish security services and changed its name to the Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA). It is obvious that members of Armenian terrorist groups, which ceased their terrorist activity and fell into lethargy or slid into a latent state, did not leave their criminal business (not least because it was the meaning of their lives) and joined the newly-formed ASALA-RM. The process of organizational-personnel consolidation in the structures of transnational Armenian terrorism and the accompanying centralization of the management of all the terrorist activity of Armenians was finally completed in the spring of 1988, when the founder and long-time leader the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, Hagop Hagopian, who was going to fly to Belgrade and then (presumably) to the Soviet Union, was killed by unknown people in Athens.

The totality of the facts set out above and their logical and chronological and logical sequence allow us to make a definite conclusion that the secret services of the United States, first and foremost - the CIA – had sought to take control of the groups and activities of transnational Armenian terrorism since 1980, or maybe since 1977, when activists of the National United Party of Armenia committed a series of terrorist attacks in Moscow and attempted to commit another series of terrorist attacks. To this end, their agent Monte Melkonian was introduced to the ASALA leadership. The level of his vocational education and special training allowed him to quickly become a leader of the “military wing” of the organization, concentrate the planning and management of all “combat operations” (in fact, terrorist attacks) in his hands and then cause a split in the governing bodies and in the ranks of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, withdraw the most active and ideologically trained members from it and form on their basis a new terrorist organization of Armenian nationalists under the familiar title of the “Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia - The Revolutionary Movement”.

The fundamental difference between the old ASALA and the newly-formed ASALA-RM was the goal-setting, - if for ASALA the main enemy was the official government and people of the Republic of Turkey, for ASALA-RM it was the Soviet Union and its citizens. Thus, in the mid-1980s, Armenian transnational terrorism found itself at the disposal of American imperialism as a result of a special operation that was brilliantly planned and carried out, becoming a new and, as it turned out later, a very effective instrument of confrontation with the USSR during the Cold War.

In the context of the statements we made, the trend of change in the attitude of transnational Armenian terrorism and its leadership to the Soviet Union and the Armenian SSR, which was part of it, looks very notable. According to Francis Hyland, whom we have repeatedly mentioned, at one of his press conferences in 1978, the leader of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, Hagop Hagopian, called the USSR a friendly country, and in 1982 ASALA militants (presumably on orders from the Soviet KGB) in Italy attacked temporary

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accommodation centers of ethnic Armenians from the countries of Southeast Europe, who were moving to take up permanent residence in California at the invitation of the US government [1, p. 48, 61] (even if there was no “order” by the Soviet secret services for the attack, it is entirely consistent with the concept of countering the immigration policy of United States in this matter, which suggests the loyal attitude of ASALA leader Hagop Hago- pian to the Soviet Union and its party-political leadership).

The only structure of transnational Armenian terrorism, which allowed itself to launch two attacks on commercial infrastructure facilities owned by the Soviet Union, was the organization “New Armenian Resistance”, which bombed the ticket office of Aeroflot and the information center of the trade mission of the USSR in Brussels in 1980, which West European experts linked to the 1979 execution of three Armenian terrorists from the National United Party of Armenia, who carried out three explosions in the center of Moscow two years earlier, one of which was carried out in a Moscow subway car. We believe that the attacks on Soviet installations were acts of revenge for the criminal repression against Armenian nationalists in the USSR, they carried an element of provocation or reconnaissance to test the response not of the political leadership and intelligence services of the Soviet Union, but of the socially active public of the Armenian SSR to such criminal actions of their foreign co-religionists and fellow compatriots. As we know, the reaction was indifferent or even latently sympathetic, which allowed analysts from NATO intelligence agencies to conclude that nationalism and religious messianism that are immanent in Armenians are more significant and dominant for citizens of the Armenian SSR than the ideology of “proletarian internationalism” artificially imposed on them by the Party-Soviet leadership of the USSR, and therefore terrorist groups of the Armenian diaspora (“spyurk”) may be able to find allies among Soviet citizens of Armenian nationality during the practical implementation of the plans for the collapse of the Soviet Union from within by provoking ethnic conflicts. The epicenter of destructive processes was Nagorno-Karabakh, in the territory of which, beginning from 1988, the first terrorist war in the history of human civilization started.

According to Hyland, the final point of the process of transformation of transnational Armenian terrorism into an anti-Soviet instrument of the Cold War was the 11 August 1988 deportation from Yerevan to Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) of the foremost ideologist of Armenian nationalism in the Soviet Union, Paruyr Hayrikyan [1, p. 88], for whom dissidents, who had previously emigrated from the Soviet Union, had created a favorable reputation in the Middle East, which was home to the bulk of the Armenian diaspora in the 1970s and 1980s and was a breeding ground for nurturing Armenian terrorists. We do not have sufficient evidence to suggest that all the above facts and events are links of the same chain of pre-developed and consistently implemented plan of US intelligence services, which were actively promoted...
by their counterparts from the KGB of the Armenian SSR, but the coincidence of a number of events in time suggests with a high degree of probability that there was a correlation between them.

The Armenian-Azerbaijani war in Nagorno-Karabakh was the first terrorist war that US intelligence agencies launched against the Soviet Union at the expense of the Armenian diaspora and at the hands of Armenian nationalists (both from the Armenian diaspora or spyurk, as well as those living in the territory of the USSR). The active participation of structures of transnational Armenian terrorism in it is confirmed by the participation in this conflict of Armenian militant detachments fully staffed by ethnic Armenians who were citizens of foreign countries. And the formation and training of these combat units equally involved both of the major political organizations of the Armenian diaspora - and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaktsutyun and the Armenian Social-Democratic Party Hnchak, armed units of which, although they interacted with each other on the battlefield, were in a state of permanent antagonism in between the terrorist attacks.

The names or operating titles of illegal armed groups, which were made up of foreign nationals of Armenian origin and operated in Nagorno-Karabakh first against units of the Interior Ministry troops of the USSR and then against the police and newly-formed voluntary armed forces of the Azerbaijani Republic, are well known. For example, the Armenian Social-Democratic Party Hnchak created the group Menz Murad from its members, natives of Lebanon and Syria. It was named so in honor of one of the leaders of the so-called "Armenian Haiduk movement" of the late 19th century in the Ottoman Empire, Hambartsum Boyadjian, known by the nickname "Menz Murad" or "Great Murad". The founder and undisputed leader of this unit throughout the war in Nagorno-Karabakh was Lebanese citizen Khevork Guzelian, a former ASALA militant, who joined ASALA-RM after Monte Melkonian. Among the Armenian separatists of Nagorno-Karabakh the Menz Murad group had the high-sounding name of a "battalion", although the number of its members did not exceed 40-60 fighters who were armed with automatic weapons, heavy machine guns and 88-mm mortars [3, p. 96, 189]. This illegal armed formation engaged in fighting in the Mardakert direction, and its combat, sanitary and non-combat losses were compensated by Yerkrapah volunteers from Armenia and the Middle East. In total, up to 200 foreign citizens and 50 citizens of Armenia went through the Menz Murad group.

Considered the most efficient detachment of the Armenian separatists of Nagorno-Karabakh, the detachment ("battalion") Arabo, which got its name in memory of yet another Armenian Haiduk of the late 19th century in the eastern provinces of Asian Turkey, Arakel alias Arabo, was formed in 1989 in Yerevan on the initiative of the Dashnaktsutyun party from among its members who were nationals of Syria and Lebanon and acquired combat experience while participating in the Lebanese civil war of 1975-1990. The permanent commander of the detachment was Lebanese citizen Marvan Egyazaryan. The detachment specialized in reconnaissance and sabotage actions, was armed with automatic weapons, heavy machine guns and 88-mm mortars, as well as cars and light armored vehicles. Arabo gained its fame for its participation in the mass murder of civilians in the town of Khojali in Nagorno-Karabakh on the night of 25 to 26 February 1992, when 613 women, children and old people were killed. The original number of fighters of this illegal armed group did not exceed 250 people and declined to 180-200 people during fighting in Shaumyan and Martuni regions of Azerbaijan in spring 1992. On 28 June 1992, the Arabo detachment was surrounded by units of the National Army of Azerbaijan near the town of Asgaran and was almost completely destroyed: 166 terrorists were killed while the command led by Egyazaryan fled the battlefield (later Egyazaryan was killed under unclear circumstances. He may have been secretly executed).

Another group of followers of transnational Armenian terrorism in the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh during the active phase of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict was the group "The Crusaders" (or "White Crusaders"), which was formed in 1989 in Armenia by a native of the Syrian city of Aleppo, US citizen Kharo Kakhegyan.
who previously served in the Special Operations Forces ("Green Berets") of the US Army for 10 years and was better known by the nickname "Spitak Arch" ("White Bear"). The unit specialized in reconnaissance and sabotage activities in the territory of the enemy, was armed with heavy and light automatic weapons, was the most active in the spring and summer of 1992 in the fighting near Martuni, Hadrut, Mardakert, Lachin and Kalbajar [3, p. 168]. On 26 June 1993, the Crusaders suffered irreparable losses in fighting near the village of Magauz in Mardakert and were disbanded (Kharo Kakhkhegyan was killed in the same battle).

Another unit in the armed forces of the Armenian separatists of Nagorno-Karabakh, comprised of representatives of the Armenian diaspora, was the so-called "Shushi special purpose battalion", whose commander was a native of Beirut (Lebanon), Girayr Sefilian, nicknamed "Giro". In the 1980s, he actively participated in hostilities as a member of the militia of the Bourj Hammoud Armenian Quarter in Beirut during the Lebanese civil war, was an active member of the Lebanese organization of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaktsutyun, trained and then worked as an instructor at training camps of ASALA and then, ASALA-RM located in the Beqaa Valley near the Syrian-Israeli border. In 1990, he and Monte Melkonian as an instructor for reconnaissance and sabotage activities arrived in Armenia to take part in the formation of Yerkrapah volunteer units of Armenian citizens to participate in hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh. In the early spring of 1992, Sefilian formed a separate assault unit mainly from foreign military mercenaries of Armenian origin who survived after Azerbaijani troops defeated their combat units (in particular, Arabo) to participate in the seizure of Shusha, which was carried out on 8-9 May 1992 as a result of Operation Wedding in the Mountains. Unlike most foreigners of Armenian origin, who took an active part in the 1988-1994 Karabakh war, Sefilian was not killed on the battlefield and integrated into the political mainstream of Armenia as a lieutenant colonel after demobilization, becoming one of the active participants in the political life of the country and joining the opposition to the current political leadership. At the same time, he did not forget his terrorist manners. In 2006, he tried to organize an armed rebellion and was arrested for that on 10 December along with his companion-in-arms Vardan Malkhasyan on charges of public appeals to violent change of the constitutional order and sentenced to eighteen months in prison for illegal possession of weapons.

To be continued

References

Lachin District is still occupied by Armenian armed forces
First Terrorist War: A Look from Russia (Transnational Armenian Terrorism and Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict of 1988-1994)

Continued. For the beginning, see IRS-Heritage 2 (21) 2015
the control of US intelligence since the beginning of the 1980s. [1, p. 184]

However, not all the followers of transnational Armenian terrorism arrived at the Karabakh war as ordinary soldiers or junior commanders of illegal armed groups. Some of them initially positioned themselves as organizers of an armed struggle against the USSR and then, against Azerbaijan. Previously, we talked about Monte Melkonian, who organized and led the mass dispatch of Armenian terrorists to the Soviet Transcaucasia from the Middle East in the late 1980s. In 1990, he arrived at the theater of war personally and immediately started setting up illegal armed formations from locals on the basis of the group of fighters known as “Patriotic Squad” he had brought with him.

In 1991, he was able to create the so-called “Martuni detachment”, which involved representatives of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh and was equipped by the hybrid principle: the command positions in it were held by foreigners experienced in fighting while ordinary fighters were local residents. This principle of staffing units was typical for the formation of “aboriginal troops” in the armed forces of major colonial powers of the 19th and 20th centuries - Britain, France and Russia. This is not surprising, since the same principle is used for staffing private military companies in the US nowadays, the experience of building and using which was developed during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. But unlike other commanders of Armenian illegal armed groups who fought in Nagorno-Karabakh, Melkonian always sought to give the grouping subordinate to him the nature of a military unit, and as a result he had not only reconnaissance-sabotage and infantry units, but also armored and artillery units, the formation, training and combat use of which was beyond the power of a person with the higher education of an orientalist and archaeologist, as he positioned himself for the general public. Monte Melkonian himself died on 12 June 1993 in ordinary skirmishes with Azerbaijani military outposts and took the secret of his links with the secret services of the United States into the grave.

International terrorists M. Melkonian, K. Guzelian, G. Kahkejian, J. Sefilyan, in addition to forming their own military units, took part in the creation of Yerkrapah “volunteer” units formed from Armenians living in the Soviet Union, some of whom were natives of Georgia.
and Russia. Not trying to promote and popularize the theme of Armenian separatism in Nagorno-Karabakh, below we present only a list of illegal armed groups with their numbers so that the reader can get an idea of what scope Armenian nationalism and separatism based on the ideals of transnational Armenian terrorism acquired in the former Soviet Transcaucasia at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s:

- Tigran Mets, 380 fighters;
- Sasuntsi David, 500 fighters;
- Andanik Zoravar, 400 fighters;
- Vrezharuner, 200 fighters;
- Dashnaktsakanner, 200 fighters;
- Aydat, 200 fighters;
- Nart, 300 fighters;
- Mush, 300 fighters;
- Ashot Yerkat, 250 fighters;
- Malatia-Sebastia, 200 fighters;
- Parapants martikner, 300 fighters;
- Hrazdan Squad, 200 fighters;
- Black Panther, 150 fighters;
- Cobra, 100 fighters;
- Tseghakron, 150 fighters.

If we summarize the above data, it is easy to calculate that in the ranks of the Nagorno-Karabakh separatists, from 4,500 to 6,000 people, which is almost equal to the number of Armenian fighters arriving from abroad, took part in fighting throughout the six years of war. In other words, for one Armenian separatist, who was previously a citizen of the USSR, there was one foreigner, who arrived in the Caucasus to fight not for “Great Armenia” but against the Soviet Union. All this once again testifies in favor of our thesis that the Armenian nationalist movement, whatever political slogans it used as a cover, is imperialistic in its essence, because it seeks to conquer a living space everywhere and always and to capture resources to support the life of the Armenian ethnic group and cement it into a single nation of the Armenian Apostolic Church.

If the question of qualifying terrorist crimes connected with the organization of or participation of foreign citizens of Armenian nationality in the 1988-1994 Karabakh war does not cause any serious doubts or obstacles, the situation surrounding the definition of the legal nature of crimes with signs of a terrorist act is not so clear. The thing is that in fighting conditions, similar criminal acts resulting in significant logistical damage - explosions, arson and so forth - are qualified in two ways - either as an act of terrorism or sabotage. The fundamental difference between them lies in the definition of objectives: In accordance with Article 205 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, a terrorist act is committed in order to intimidate the population and destabilize the activities of the authorities or international organizations, or to influence their decisions, while sabotage, in accordance with Article 281 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, is aimed at destroying or damaging enterprises, buildings, transport infrastructure facilities and vehicles, communications and facilities in order to undermine the economic security and defense of the country and therefore is not considered a terrorist crime. Identification of this difference between the two crimes that are nearly identical according to the method of execution in specific historical conditions is not always possible, which leads to errors in their legal qualification during the investigation when an act of sabotage is mistaken for a terrorist act, and vice versa.

The interpretation of the events of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict known to us has been affected by similar
mistakes. It should be borne in mind that the Armenian side never considered its actions to be terrorist activities, although they are terrorism in accordance with the criminal legislation of Russia and most other countries. The terrorist attacks and other terrorist crimes committed by the Armenian side during the war were recorded by the National Security Ministry of the Azerbaijan Republic, which published a list of criminal acts qualified in this way on its official website. [2] In view of the above reason, we do not agree that a number of crimes mentioned there, which should be qualified, in our opinion, as murders motivated by political, ideological, racial, ethnic or religious hatred or enmity or hatred or hostility in respect of a social group (Point L, Part 2, Article 105 of the Criminal Code) or as sabotage (Article 281 of the Criminal Code) should be attributed to terrorist acts. But even without this, the list of terrorist acts committed by Armenian separatists in Azerbaijan during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which cause no doubt in their legal qualification, looks impressive:

- On 12 December 1988, an IL-76 aircraft carrying 77 volunteers from Azerbaijan to help earthquake victims was shot down with a Stinger missile near the town of Spitak in Gugark District of Armenia;
- On 12 December 1988, an AN-24 aircraft of the Soviet Air Force was shot down with a Stinger missile near the town of Spitak, killing two crew members;
- On 16 September 1989, a passenger bus traveling from Tbilisi to Baku was blown up. 5 people were killed and 25 were injured;
- On 13 February 1990, a passenger bus traveling from Shusha to Baku was blown up on the 105th kilometer of the Yevlakh-Lachin highway. 13 people were injured;
- On 24 March 1990, locomotive and 3 wagons were blown up on the 364th kilometer of the Norashen-Baku railroad, 150 meters of railway tracks fell into disrepair;
- On 11 July 1990, a passenger bus carrying passengers from Terter to Kalbajar and a caravan of trucks carrying agricultural products were blown up. 8 people were killed and 23 were injured;
- On 10 August 1990, a LAZ passenger bus with the registration number 43-80 AGF was blown up on the Shamkir-Ganja road near the village of Nadel in Khanlar District, killing 17 and injuring 16 people;
- On 10 August 1990, a bus traveling from Tbilisi to Agdam was blown up. 20 people were killed and 30 were injured;

Armenian terrorist was committing his crimes under a Slavic guise

- On 15 September 1990, the TV and radio center of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region was blown up in the city of Khankandi (Stepanakert) blown. 2 people were injured;
- On 30 November 1990, a bus carrying employees of the Ministry of the Interior from Shusha to the Khankandi airport was blown up in the town of Aga Korpu in Asgaran District. 2 police officers were injured;
- On 14 March 1991, a bus traveling from Agdam to Shusha was blown up. 3 people were killed and 4 were wounded;
- On 30 May 1991, the Moscow-Baku passenger train was blown up near the Khasavyurt station in Dagestan. 11 people were killed and 22 were wounded;
- On 31 June 1991, the Moscow-Baku passenger train was blown up near the Khasavyurt station in Dagestan. 16 people were killed and 20 were injured;
- On 8 September 1991, a bus traveling from Agdam to Garadagli was blown up. 6 people were killed and 36 were injured;
On 20 November 1991, a MI-8 helicopter carrying members of an international peacekeeping mission was shot down near the village of Garakand in Khojavand District, killing 22 people;

On 8 January 1992, the Sovetskaya Kalmykia (now Academician Topchubashov) ferry carrying passengers from Krasnovodsk (Turkmenistan) to Baku was blown up, killing 25 and injuring 88 people;

On 28 January 1992, a civilian helicopter carrying passengers from Agdam to Shusha was shot down near Shusha. 41 passengers and 3 crew members were killed;

On 28 February 1993, the Kislovodsk-Baku passenger train was blown up near the Gudermes station in Chechnya. 11 people were killed and 18 were injured;

In June 1993, a passenger train standing on the siding of the Baku railway station was blown up. No one was killed or wounded;

On 1 February 1994, the Kislovodsk-Baku train was blown up at the Baku railway station. 3 people were killed and 20 were injured;

On 9 February 1994, a cargo wagon standing on the siding near the Khudat station was blown up;

On 18 March 1994, a Lockheed C-130 Hercules plane of the Iranian Air Force was downed near Khankandi. 34 people were killed;

On 13 April 1994, the Moscow-Baku passenger train was blown up near the Dagestanskiye Ogni station in Dagestan, killing 3 people and injuring 3 others;

On 3 July 1994, there was an explosion on the train between the 28 May and Ganjlik stations of the Baku metro. 13 people were killed and 42 were wounded.

Most of the above crimes, which we attributed to the category of terrorist acts, were committed far away from the region of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and therefore, could not pursue some military-technical and even more so, military-strategic objectives and contribute to the reduction of the combat capability of the Azerbaijan Republic and its armed forces. All these crimes, according to the organizers, had to have a demoralizing psychological effect on the population and public-political leadership of the country, which is the main criterion for qualifying them as terrorist attacks in this case.

As a rule, such criminal acts are investigated with great difficulty, and the investigating authorities are not always able to identify the perpetrators. However, in cases where a terrorist is unmasked and punished, the law enforcement agencies have a real chance to reconstruct by analogy the techniques and methods used by the organizers of terrorist acts while preparing and implementing them.

A source of such information for us is the sentence passed by the Military Court of the Azerbaijan Republic dated 22 July 1994 on Russian citizen Igor Khatkovskiy, who was sentenced to 8 years in prison for committing a terrorist act at the Baku railway station on 2 June the year before. Subsequently, Khatkovskiy was involved as a witness in criminal proceedings against retired employees of the State Administration of National Security of the Republic of Armenia and the Federal Security Service of Russia, D. A. Oganesyan, A. A. Goloyan and B. V. Simonyan, who helped Armenian militants during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to gather intelligence and carry out sabotage and terrorist attacks, but were charged with illicit trafficking in firearms and explosives and illegal crossing of the state border of the Russian Federation, the sentence on whom was passed on 11 March 1996 by the Tambov garrison.
military court [1, p. 356-391]. Another source in this issue is the verdict of the Judicial Board for Criminal Cases of the Supreme Court of the Azerbaijan Republic dated 29 April 1998 on the case of A. S. Aslanov, who was charged with a terrorist attack on the Baku metro on 3 July 1994 and convicted for the crime [1, p. 392-411].

As each sentence in a criminal case should contain as an act of judicial authority a detailed description of all stages of the preparation and commission of the crime, we have no need to do so directly in the text of this publication. Therefore, we will concentrate our efforts on identifying similarities in the preparation, planning and commission of these terrorist acts.

Firstly, the organizers of the two investigated and, therefore, all other terrorist acts committed on the territory of the Azerbaijan Republic through the territory of the Russian Federation in the 1990s were staff members of the security services of the Republic of Armenia, or to be more precise, the department of intelligence operations on enemy territory at the State Administration (later, Ministry) of National Security of the Republic of Armenia. This was done in spite of the fact that at that time the Alma-Ata Agreement of 1992 on the mutual renunciation by the special services of the CIS countries of the implementation of intelligence activities in each other’s territory came into legal force. Nevertheless, as we can see from the criminal cases against Khatkovskiy and Aslanov, employees of the department of intelligence operations in enemy territory at the State Administration of National Security of the Republic of Armenia recruited perpetrators on the territory of Russia and used its territory for the purchase and transit of explosive substances used in the implementation of these terrorist acts. Thus, the Armenian special services, preparing and carrying out terrorist acts on the territory of not only the Azerbaijan Republic, but also of the Russian Federation, violated the national legislation of the two countries and Armenia’s commitments on international legal agreements within the framework of the CIS.

Secondly, to hide the involvement of the intelligence personnel of the Republic of Armenia in the organization, planning and execution of terrorist acts in case these crimes were solved by the special services of Azerbaijan and Russia, persons who were neither ethnic Armenians nor Armenian citizens of other nationality were used as perpetrators of these criminal acts. Khatkovskiy and Aslanov were used not only as terrorists and perpetrators, but also as sources of intelligence information of socio-political and military-technical nature, indications of which are contained in the texts of the judicial acts issued with respect to them, which proves once again that the intelligence services of Armenia violated the international-legal obligations of their country within the framework of the CIS.

Thirdly, the organizers of the crimes did not particularly count on the success of the perpetrators and did not consider their acts of terrorism significant from a military-political and military-strategic point of view. They counted on the psychological effect rather than material damage. If the criminal acts of Aslanov were successful, this is explained by the fact that before being taken prisoner by the forces of the Armenian side of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, he had professional military knowledge and skills (Aslanov was the first captain of the Soviet and then Azerbaijani army), while the actions of Khatkovskiy were dilettante, goofy and ineffective and did not compensate the financial and material resources that had been invested in him.

To be continued

Bibliography

In addition to numerous acts of terrorism and widespread terrorist crimes related to the organization by foreign nationals of illegal armed groups in the territory of Armenia and their participation in the activities of such groups, representatives of the Armenian side to the conflict committed other crimes of a similar nature during the Karabakh war, facts that were recorded on the Azerbaijani side. First of all, we are talking about a

Car in which journalist S. Asgarova, Lt-Col Larionov, Maj Ivanov and Sgt Goyek were shot dead by Armenian terrorists on 9 January 1991

End. For the beginning, see IRS-Heritage 2 (21), 3 (22) 2015
very specific terrorist crime like an armed insurgency, criminal liability for which is stipulated by Article 279 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. The main qualifying feature of this criminal act is the motivation and goal-setting of participation in the crime: those guilty of committing it take action to change the constitutional system or the territorial integrity of the country. Actions of this kind were committed by soldiers of Armenian origin under the commander of the 2nd Battalion of the 336th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 23rd Motorized Infantry Division of the 4th Army of the CIS Joint Armed Forces under the command of Major Seyran Ohanyan, who not only seized fighting equipment - infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-2) - without a military order, but also used them against Azerbaijani territorial defense units in the battle of 25 February 1992 for the town of Khojali, which subsequently led to mass deaths of civilians in this town.

Qualifying elements of a crime in the form of an armed rebellion are clear in this case: soldiers seized assault weapons without orders from higher commanders, acted willfully on the Armenian side of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and took action to change the constitutional system and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, providing aid to international Armenian terrorists in seizing part of the sovereign territory of that country. In this case, we are surprised by the fact that the mass murder of civilians in the town of Khojali, which occurred after the armed rebellion of the 2nd Battalion of the 336th infantry regiment, was qualified by the law enforcement agencies of Azerbaijan as a crime of genocide, after which the authorities and public of this country have been actively using this criminal event for propaganda purposes, while the armed rebellion that preceded it has yet to receive its criminal legal classification.

The actions of the High Command of the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS, which followed this event, confirm this crime: on 3 March, the 336th Motorized Rifle Regiment was withdrawn from the place of its permanent deployment in Stepanakert (Nagorno-Karabakh) to a military base in Gardabani (Georgia) and disbanded as a rebellious military unit. All officers and non-commissioned officers of the regiment were dismissed from military service and conscripts were transferred to other units [1, p. 189].

The commander of the 2nd Battalion, Seyran Ohanyan, who led the rebellion, took refuge among the Armenian separatists of Nagorno-Karabakh and became one of the field commanders of illegal armed groups, and then he served as commander of the “army of defense” of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh republic and is now minister of defense of the Republic of Armenia in the rank of colonel-general. The very fact that this man heads the Armenian armed forces suggests that the illegal armed groups of Armenian separatists of Nagorno-Karabakh, organizationally united in the structure of the “Karabakh defense army”, are now integrated into the organizational and personnel structure of the armed forces of Armenia and are essentially their occupying corps in the
occupied territories of the Azerbaijan Republic. In addition, this fact shows that people who perpetrated terrorist crimes during the 1988-1994 Karabakh war are national heroes in modern Armenia and are among the top officials of this state.

Seyran Ohanyan is not the only military leader of the regular armed forces of Armenia, whose military career was closely linked to membership of illegal armed formations of Nagorno-Karabakh separatists and international Armenian terrorists. Apart from him, several other former field commanders of such formations serve in the leadership of the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Armenia, and from the point of view of Russian criminal law, they are criminals guilty of terrorist crimes under Article 208 of the Criminal Code.

The most famous among them is Lieutenant General Manvel Grigoryan, who held the post of deputy defense minister in 2000-2008 and headed the veterans organization of the Yerkapah union of volunteers, which united former members of illegal armed groups of Armenian separatists of Nagorno-Karabakh directly involved in fighting against units of the Interior Ministry troops of the USSR and the National Army of Azerbaijan. Manvel Grigoryan first was a militant and warlord of the so-called “Echmiadzin squad” in 1988-1992, in 1992 he was enlisted in the armed forces of Armenia and was appointed commander of a separate motorized infantry battalion, and in 1996, by the decree of the Armenian president, he was awarded the rank of major general and in 2000 - lieutenant-general [2, p. 82-83].

Among the current Armenian commanders, there are those who have a track record of not only terrorist crimes, but also crimes against military service. One of these people is the deputy chief of the General Staff of the Armenian Armed Forces, Lieutenant-General Haykaz Bagramyan, who, as a battery commander stationed in the city of Sardarabad in 1988, handed over weapons and military equipment of the Soviet Army under his jurisdiction to militants of illegal armed groups of Armenian separatists of Nagorno-Karabakh and then joined them. In 1991, he was chief of staff of the so-called “Martuni detachment”, the commander of which was the international Armenian terrorist, US citizen Monte Melkonian. In 2003, he was enlisted in military service in the armed forces of Armenia as commander of the 2nd Army Corps, and in 2003, he was transferred to the central office of the Ministry of Defense [2, p. 65]. Currently, he is engaged in the organization and military coordination of interaction between the armed forces of Armenia and the “Karabakh defense army” illegal armed formation.

The generals, who earlier committed terrorist crimes in the form of membership of illegal armed groups during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, are present not only in the leadership of the armed forces of Armenia, but also in other departments, which provide for military service. One such commander is the commander of police forces, first deputy chief of police of the Interior Ministry of Armenia, Lieutenant-General Levon Yeranosyan. He began his career in the ranks of militants of the so-called “Echmiadzin detachment” (together with M. Grigoryan). In 1992, he was enlisted in the armed forces of Armenia and passed all stages of the career ladder from the deputy battalion commander to the commander of an army corps. In 2001, he was awarded the rank of major-general and lieutenant-general, and in 2013, he was appointed to his current position [2, p. 102-103]. It is para-

Three-year-old Azerbaijani kid was wounded when a bus traveling from Tbilisi to Baku was blown up by Armenian terrorists on 16 September 1989
doxical that in modern Armenian, a former terrorist serves as the main fighter against terrorism.

The list of Armenian generals, who were field commanders of illegal armed groups of Armenian separatists in the years of the Karabakh conflict, if desired, can be continued for as long as they are all listed by name. In modern Armenia no man can achieve success in life, if he has not previously participated in the 1988-1994 Karabakh war as a Yerkrapah volunteer or has not served in more recent years as a member of the occupying corps of the Armenian armed forces entitled the “Karabakh defense army” and has not become a member of the Yerkrapah Union of Volunteers after that. We do not consider it necessary to continue this list, as only names will change in it while the content of the acts will remain unchanged. The available information is sufficient to unequivocally conclude that at the level of the higher military leadership of Armenia, the illegal armed formations of Nagorno-Karabakh separatists are being integrated into the organizational and personnel structure of the armed forces of the country, which, in fact, rehabilitates the criminal acts of militants from among local residents and international Armenian terrorists from other countries, who participated in the commission of terrorist crimes and who fought in their ranks, thus enabling them to avoid criminal liability.

Speaking on the example of Seyran Ohanyan, Haykaz Bagramyan, Manvel Grigoryan and Levon Yeranosyan about the presence in the top echelon of the command of the armed forces and other “law enforcement” agencies of Armenia of persons involved in the commission of terrorist crimes during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, we cannot ignore with delicate silence the fact that almost all currently existing senior officials of the political leadership of this country were directly involved in the commission of such crimes in 1988-1994. The incumbent president Serzh Sargsyan, and Robert Kocharyan, who previously held the post of head of state, personally directed the actions of illegal armed groups of Armenian separatists of Nagorno-Karabakh during the 1988-1994 Karabakh war, and not only those formed from natives of the region, but also those that were fully or partially staffed with international terrorists of Armenian nationality who had arrived from abroad. As follows from the official biography of Robert Kocharyan, after being dismissed from the post of secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan at the Karabakh silk plant in 1988, he took charge of the Miatsum (Unification) social movement, which stood for the separation of Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan and its merger with Armenia, i.e. he became the ideologist and leader of Armenian separatism in the region, and in August 1992, when the Armenian armed forces invaded districts of lower Karabakh, he was appointed chairman of the State Defense Committee and prime minister of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh republic and, in fact, he led Armenia’s aggression against Azerbaijan, the backbone of which was made up of ethnic Armenian militants of illegal armed groups who had come to the Caucasus from the Middle East, Europe and North America.

His successor as president of Armenia, Serzh Sargsyan, in 1989 exchanged the position of head of the
Propaganda Department of the Stepanakert City Committee and assistant of the first secretary of the regional committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region of the Azerbaijan SSR for the post of chairman of the committee of self-defense forces of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh republic, concentrating in his hands operational control over all the military operations of Armenian separatists and international terrorists in Nagorno-Karabakh. It is he who is personally responsible for the organization of such a terrorist crime as the armed rebellion of the 2nd Battalion of the 336th motorized rifle regiment on 25 February 1992, which resulted in mass deaths of civilians in the town of Khojali a day later.

The common fates and milestones in the biographies of the second and third presidents of Armenia - Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan – are bright and visible evidence of our earlier thesis that in Soviet times the party and communist leadership of the Armenian SSR and other areas with a predominantly Armenian population did not really stick to and respected the canons of the official ideology of "proletarian internationalism" and in opposition to it, actively and secretly contributed to the development of nationalist and extremist mentalities in society, which later served as the breeding ground for the perception of and support for ideas of transnational Armenian terrorism.

Therefore, it should not be particularly surprising that after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Armenia's independence and national sovereignty, and particularly after the end of the active phase of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, the techniques and methods of transnational Armenian terrorism, which proved ineffective during the war, were transferred to the internal political life of this state where they took root and were most actively used in the power struggle between different factions of the Armenian political elite. But unfortunately, we do not have sufficient information about all the crimes related to the attempt on the lives of politicians and public figures of this country in connection with their activities, but we managed to indicate some of them:

- August 8, 1998 - Armenian Prosecutor General Henrik Khachatryan was killed by unknown people in Yerevan;
- December 10, 1998 – Deputy Defense Minister of Armenia Vahram Khorkhoruni was killed by mysterious assassins;
- February 9, 1999 - Deputy Interior Minister and Commander of the Interior Troops Artsrun Margaryan was shot at close range on the street.

All these terrorist crimes, qualified in accordance with Article 277 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation as an "Attempt on the life of a statesman or public figure committed to end his state or other political activity or out of revenge for such activity", were a prelude or a kind of dress rehearsal for the most sensational act of terrorism in the modern history of the Republic of Armenia - the mass killing of the leaders and several members of the National Assembly (parliament) and several ministers of the government of the Republic of Armenia accompanied by hostage-taking on 27 October 1999.

On that day, at 1715, five armed men - the leader of the group Nairi Hunanyan, his younger brother Karen, Eduard Grigoryan, Vram Galstyan and Derenik Bejanyan - burst into the conference room of the National Assembly of Armenia and opened fire at deputies and government members sitting on the podium and in the hall. The attack killed the chairman of the National Assembly, Karen Demirchyan, Prime Minister Vazgen Sarkisyan, Deputy Speakers Yuri Bakhshyan and Ruben Miroyan, Minister of Operational Issues Leonard Petrosyan, MPs Armenak Armenakyan, Mikael Kotanyan and Henrik Abrahamyan. MPs Hermine Nagdalyan, Andranik Manukyan, Armen Khachatryan, Edmond Tsaturyan, Zhirayr Gevorgyan and Emma Khudabashyan and Minister of Privatization Pavel Galtakhchyan were wounded. Justice Minister David Harutyunyan, Minister of Agriculture Gagik Shahbazyan, Minister and Head of Government Staff Shahen Karamanukyan, Education Minister Eduard Kazaryan, Minister of Culture Roland Sharoyan, Minister of State Revenues Smbat Ayvazyan, Minister of Transport Yervand Zakharyan, Minister of Communications Ruben Tonoyan, Urban Development Minister Hravanyan, Finance Minister Levon Barkhudaryan, Ecology Minister Georg Vardanyan and several members of the National Assembly were taken hostage. The terrorists freed some of the hostages in the evening, but 40 were still kept hostage.

According to one of the hostages, Armenian Justice Minister David Harutyunyan, the terrorists themselves regarded their actions as a "small revolution". They said that their main goal was to eliminate the deputy speaker of parliament, Vazgen Sarkisyan, the head of the Yerkrapah Union of Volunteers and leader of international Armenian terrorists who participated in the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict, who, according to the new generation of Armenian terrorists, "prevented the people from living in dignity, and now, after his elimination, they will form a provisional government, and from tomorrow life in the country will be very different and everyone will live a better life."

The trial of the terrorists began on 15 February 2001, and on 2 December 2003, the Court of First Instance of Yerevan’s Centre and Nork-Marash communities announced the verdict in the case of the terrorist act in the Armenian parliament. Six of the defendants - former journalist and leader of the gang Nairi Hunanyan and his brother Karen Hunanyan, Edik Grigoryan, Vram Galstyan, Derenik Bejanyan and Ashot Knyazyan were sentenced to life imprisonment, while Hamlet Stepanyan was sentenced to 14 years in prison. All seven were found guilty on a number of articles of the Criminal Code of Armenia, including treason and terrorism. Three of them died in prison: according to the official version, Norayr Galstyan died of electrocution, the uncle of the Hunanyan brothers - Vram Galstyan committed suicide and Hamlet Stepanyan died of acute heart failure.

Despite the fact that Nairi Hunanyan indicated in his testimony that he was the sole organizer and leader of the crime, the criminal case against the organizers was separated from the general criminal case on 11 July 2000 and was investigated separately. The investigation of this case lasted until November 2004, and then it was dropped because the organizers were never found. At the same time, the former member of the National Assembly of Armenia, Musheg Movsisyan, who was accused of involvement in the terrorist attack, but released later due to lack of evidence, was killed in a car accident, while some of the witnesses of the incident quickly turned out to be outside Armenia or died under suspicious circumstances. On 28 January 2002, the chairman of the board of the Public Television of Armenia, Tigran Nagdalyan, was killed in Yerevan. According to the lawyer O. Yunoshev, he was related to the possible rigging of videos related to the events of 27 October 1999.

Concluding the consideration of the issue about the place and role of transnational Armenian terrorism in the events of the 1988-1994 Karabakh war, I should say that by the standards of historical science, not much time has passed since the end of the active phase of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and people who personally committed terrorist crimes in those years and have an immediate interest in concealing the truth and objective reality are now in power in Armenia. Therefore, the full and complete investigation of this matter will be the subject of scientific research for historians of generations to come.

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